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Nicholas Lambert is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services 
Institute (Whitehall) as well as visiting fellow at Australian National 
University. He has held fellowships at Yale University, Southampton 
University and Wolfson College, Oxford. Most recently he was visiting 
fellow at the University of Texas at Austin. 
Lambert received undergraduate and graduate degrees at Worcester 
College, Oxford. His first book, Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution, won 
the Distinguished Book Prize from the Society for Military History.  He 
has published several major articles, winning three Moncado prizes for 
best article from the Society for Military History, as well as the Julian 
Corbett prize from the Institute for Historical Research for the best 
article on naval history.
His forthcoming book is Taming Armageddon: Economic Warfare 
Planning and Practice, 1906-1916 (Harvard University Press, 2011).  
Based on an unprecedented command of the relevant archives, it 
offers a wholly new account of British naval and grand strategic 
planning before World War I; major insights into globalization and the 
transformation of the world financial and commercial systems, and 
their implications for international law; and a highly original account 
of Woodrow Wilson's diplomacy.  His lecture, which will focus on the 
last of these topics, is relevant to military and diplomatic historians, as 










In Taming Armageddon, Lambert argues that contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, British naval policy under Sir John Fisher and his 
successors did not focus on seeking a decisive battle against the 
Germans in the North Sea with dreadnought battleships.  Rather, 
given the highly fluid diplomatic environment during his tenure as First 
Sea Lord, Fisher sought to build a balanced fleet with flexible 
capabilities capable of responding to an array of potential threats.  
Under Fisher and his successors, the Royal Navy began to develop a 
strategy known as "economic warfare."
This strategy was very different from the strategy of "blockade," which 
is the term most often used to describe Britain's plans to bring 
economic pressure to bear against its enemies.  "Blockade" was a legal 
concept developed in previous centuries.  In the late 19th century, 
however, the advent of submarines made the traditional "close" 
blockade near the enemy's coast suicidal, but the obvious solution of a 
"distant" blockade was not recognized under international law.  
Morever, the concomitant transformation of the world's 
communications and financial systems rendered the concept of 
"blockade" totally inapplicable to the era of globalization.  
For instance, "blockade" assumed that ownership of a cargo remained 
constant throughout a ship's journey; but with the development of 
credit-financed trade and exchanges, it became common for ownership 
of a cargo to change hands multiple times while a ship was at sea.  
How then was a blockading navy to determine whether the cargo was 
owned by a neutral or a belligerent?  Instead of tracking and 
seizing cargoes, the Admiralty's plan for economic warfare relied on 
Britain's dominance of merchant shipping: if enemies could not find 
merchant ships to carry the goods they needed, then there would be 
no need to track the cargoes.
In 1912, Britain's political executive adopted the Navy's plan for 
economic warfare as national strategy in the event of war.  Economic 
warfare was an alternative to the "continental commitment": contrary 
to the Army's claims, it represented a far more plausible strategy for 
victory than committing several British divisions to turn the tide of 
battle against the huge German army.  Accordingly, when World War I 
began in August 1914, the British Cabinet and the Admiralty 
quickly implemented economic warfare through royal proclamation and 
orders-in-council.  Within weeks, however, the commitment to 
economic warfare began to crumble under protests from British 
departments of state who resented Admiralty control of issues that 
they regarded as their bailiwicks, and from neutrals who resented the 
Royal Navy's interference with their trade.  Of special concern to the 
Cabinet were the protests from the United States, which will be the 
focus of Lambert's paper.
Although the Wilson administration claimed to be acting out of 
principled commitment to the cause of neutral rights, its protests were 
in fact motivated by financial, economic, and political self-
interest.  First, a financial crisis which accompanied the political crisis 
of July 1914 threatened to plunge the United States into a recession in 
a mid-term election year.  Second, American exporters could not get 
access to merchant ships to move their goods to Europe.  Since cotton 
was then the most important American export, cotton growers were hit 
especially hard.  Southern Democrats in Congress lobbied President 
Wilson to pressure Britain to loosen its restrictions on merchant 
shipping, even though Britain had every right under international law 
to prohibit its merchantmen from carrying American goods.  Wilson 
went even farther.  In violation of international law, which prohibited 
the re-flagging of belligerent merchantmen, Wilson sought to purchase 
German merchantmen which had taken refuge from the Royal Navy in 
American ports.  The British Admiralty was outraged, but the Foreign 
Office, for its own reasons, did not forcefully challenge the American 
actions.
Previous scholars of Wilson's diplomacy have not fully appreciated the 
nature of the Anglo-American dispute.  This is partly because they have 
not understood the dispute from the British perspective in the context 
of the Admiralty's plans for economic warfare, and partly because they 
have not accounted for the financial practices which bore heavily on 
the legal aspects of the dispute.  Comprehension of these issues 
transforms our understanding of Anglo-American relations in World War 
I.
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